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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah
_MARCELLUS K. SNOW,

. . Plaint-iff
vs,

~

ALVIN KEDDINGTON, County.
Clerk of Salt Lake County,
Defendent

Plaintiff's Brief
This action seeks an interpretation of the effects of the
amendment of Section 10 of .A.rticle VIII of the State Constitution, which took effect January 1, 1947; and the validity and
effect of a part of the legislative act passed March 13, 1947
amending Section 19-13-6 U. C. A. 1943. In brief, the State
constitution, from its adoption in 1895 to January 1, 1947,
provided in Section 10 of Article VII, as follows:
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"A county attorney shall be elected by the qualified
voters of each county who shall hold his office for a term
of two years."
Pursuant to said constitutional provtston the legislature
provided in the Revised Statutes of 1898 Sections 541 and 545,
that among the county officers was a county attorney who should
be elected biennially at the general election, and hold office for
a term of two years. These statutes were continued in effect
until 1947, appearing as Sections 19-13-2 and 19-13-6 U. C. A.
1943. The legislature, in 1945, proposed to amend Section 10
or Article VII of the constitution to read that a county attorney
should be elected ((for a term of four years." Such proposed
amendment was submitted to voters at the general election in
November 1946. It carried, and by its express terms became
effective as a part of the constitution January 1, 1947. In the
fall of 1946, Edward M. Morrissey, filed a declaration of candidacy for nomination as county attorney· of Salt Lake county,
was no~i~ated for such office and was elected to such office at
the general election in November, 1946, the same election at
which the people voted on the above mentioned amendment to
the constitution. He assumed the office of county attorney pursuant to law on January 6, 1947. The legislature on March 13,
1947, passed an act amending Section 19-13-6 U. C. A. 1943, to
read:
ccThe county attorney shall be elected at the General
Election held in November 1950, and etJery four years
thereafter. Incumbent County attorneys shall hold office
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
until successors are elected and qualified at the General
Elections inN o·z'enlber 1950''

The further essential facts are that at the time Edward
M. Morrissey was elected county attorney, the constitution and
statutes both fixed the term of office at two years, such term,
by express provisions of law beginning at noon, January 6, 1947
and ending at noon, January 3, 1949.
The plaintiff in this action, believing and contending that
the office of county attorney is therefore open to election this
fall, tendered and sought to file with the defendant a declaration of candidacy for the office of County Attorney of Salt Lake
County, as required by law to become a candidate for election
to that office at the general election in November 1948. Defendant, taking the view that the amendment to the constitution,
and the statutory amendment, both set out above, continued the
present incumbent in office two years after expiration of the
term for which he was elected, refused to accept the declaration
of candidacy and file the same.

To determine the questions

thus presented, this action was filed.
The solution or answers to. these questions is found within
the following legal propositions:
1. The length or term of an office is fixed by- the law in

effect at the time of election.
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2. Public policy requires that the term of office be fixed

before election.
3. The constitutional amendment does not change the
existing term of office.
4. · The legislative enactment attempting to continue incumbents in office by by-passing the 1948 general election is
void.
We explore them in order.
THE ESTABLISHED RULE OF LAW IS THAT
THE TERM OF OFFICE IS FIXED BY THE LAW IN EFFECT AT THE TIME OF THE ELECTION.
1.

To hold otherwise is to destroy the elective character of
public offices. The following cases definitely establish this
rule of law:
Wingate vs. Flynn, 249 N. Y. S. 351, 139 Misc. 779,
affirmed 250 N. Y. S. 917, 177 N. E. 195.
Board of Elections vs. State Ex Rel Schneide.tr, 128 Ohio St.
273, 191 N. E. 115,97 A. L. R. 1417.
If the elective character of public offices are to be preserved we must apply the provisions of the constitution which
were in effect at the time the election was held. It is generally
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accepted that the same rules which govern the construction and
interpretation of statutes and written instruments generally
apply to and control in the interpretations of written constitutions. People vs. Fletcher, 50 N. Y. 288; Wingate vs. Flynn,
supra.
Constitutional provisions, like statutes, act prospectively
and never retrospectively. 12 Corpus Juris 721; McGrew vs.
Industrial Commission, 96 Utah 203, 85 Pac. (2nd) 608; Wingate vs. Flynn, supra. This principle is forcibly stated in Wingate vs. Flynn in 249 N.Y. S. at page 355 where the court held:
Hit is one of the canons of construct~on, applicable as well to
constitutions as to statutes, that provisions prescribing power or
giving authority are to be construed, in the absence of clear
intention to the contrary, as conferring P?wer or authority
to be exercised in respect to the future, and not as to transactions
already consummated." Supporting the statement, the Wingate case cites People. Ex rel. Eldred vs. Palmer, 154 N. Y.
133, 139 N. E. 1084, 1085, from which they quote the law, as
generally accepted by the courts, as the leading authority on
the question: (CAs stated in People Ex rel Eldred vs. Palmer,
it would be contrary to all precedent that the voters should not
be advised, before casting their votes, of the duration of the
term of officers to be elected.''
This clear statement of the law is followed by: ccPublic
policy requires that the term of office of an elective officer shall
be fixed before the election.

People Ex rei. Fowler vs. Bull,
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N.Y. 57, 7 Am. Rep. 302."
In the instant case up to and including election day and
six weeks thereafter, both the constitution and the statutes fixed
the term of the county attorney at two years. At the time
electors cast their ballots, the constitution and statutes limited·
the county attorney to a tv1o year tern1 of office. By law, therefore, the county attorney elected November 6, 1946, was elected
for a term of office of two years and no more. To hold otherwise is to interfere with the right of the people to choose their
elective officers. This right is basic and must be preserved.
The physical act of casting a ballot means nothing, but the
expression of the public will involved in that ballot means
everything; and such expression must not be defeated, directly
or indirectly. Courts should never construe·or permit constitutional amendments to be so applied as to deprive the people of
the right to select their officers by ballot. To do so is to destroy
our present form of government. The question has been discussed by the co~rts of the nation on several occasions. In
People Ex rel. Davis vs. Gardner, 45 N. Y. 812, affirming 59
Barb-. 198, and quoted as excellent authority in Wingate vs.
·Flynn, supra, the defendant had been elected county judge at
the general election held in November. The term of office as
then fixed by the constitution was four years. At the same
general election, the amended judiciary article of the constitution was ratified by the people fixing the term of this office at
six years. The amendment took effect January 1, 1870, at which
time the defendant also assumed office for another term pursuant to his election in November 1869. The court, in passing
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9
upon the duration of the defendant's term of office, decided
that the defendant held the office until the expiration of four
years from the 31st day of December, 1869. In People Ex rei.
Clark vs. Norton, 59 Barb. 169, the defend~nt was elected
county judge at the general election in November 1869 and on
January 1, 1870 took office. The same amendment referred to
in People Ex. rei Davis vs. Gardner became effective January 1,
1870. The general term held: ttThat the defendant had been
elected for the term of four years AND THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION IN EFFECT AT THE
TIME OF THE ELECTION DETERMINED THE LENGTH
OF THE DEFENDANT'S TERM RATHER THAN THOSE
WHICH WENT INTO EFFECT SIMULTANEOUSLY
WITH DEFENDANT'S ASSUMING OFFICE.
On the date of Edward M. Morrissey's election, the voters
of Salt Lake County were by constitutional provision to choose
a county attorney for a term of two years. This term began
January 6, 1947 and ends January 3, 1949. On January 1, 1947,
for the first time, the constitution authorized the election by the
voters of a county attorney for the term of four years. Prior
to that date there was no authority for anyone to name a county
attorney for a longer period than two years,· and the constitutional amendment provided that the voters (tshall elect a county
attorney for a term of four years." It delegated no authority
to the legislature to designate a county attorney for two years,
four years, or any other period of time. He is to be elected by
the people. Any vacancy in the office is to be filled by the
County Commission.

The amendment 'specifically states that
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it is to. take effect January 1, 1947, and therefore speaks only
of elections held on or after that date. The wording is positive
and definite, and not susceptible of more than one interpretation.
PUBLIC POLICY REQUIR~S THAT THE TERM
OF OFFICE BE FIXED BEFORE ELECTION.
2.

The words of the constitution, at the time of the election
of Morrissey, were: t(A county attorney shall be elected ...
.and shall hold his office for a term of two years." The clear
import of this language is that the county attorney is to be
chosen by the electors for a period of two years, and not for
a period to be subsequently defined by the legislature. As said
by the New York Court in People Ex rel. Eldred vs. Palmer,
154 New York 133, 47 N. E. 1084, 5, ((It would be contrary
to all precedent that the electors should not be advised, before
casting their votes, _of the durati9n of the term of the officers
to be elected. The power attempte_d to be exercised by the
legislature in this case, if sustained, v;ould open the door to
obvious abuses. It would practically confer upon the legislature
the power to prescribe a long or short term, and lengthen or
shorten the official life of an officer, who, by the constitution,
is to be elected by the people, upon consideration wholly foreign
to their true inter~sts." In People vs. Bull, 46 N.Y. 57, 7 Am.
Rep. 302, the court earlier considered this question and declared
that if the term were not required to be :fixed before election,
the legislature, by its fiat, and without the concurrence of the
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electors, could protect an incumbent in the possession of an
office for a term for which he had never been elected. Certainly it is not a rational point to say that the people just elected
a man to an office for a term to be thereafter fixed by the
legislature, and subject to the changes of politics, social, economic, racial or religious convictions. It is a basic rule· of construction and application of constitutions and statutes, of public
policy, that unless the power is expressly given, power and
authority is to be exercised in respect to the future, and not
as to transactions already consummated or rights or privileges
already granted. We turn again to the case of Peop_le vs.
Palmer, supra, and quote: nit :fixes the term at the only period
which with certainty was included with the intention of the
electors, and prevents any hiatus in the incumbency of county
offices. It enforces the public policy that the term of oIfice of
an elected officer shall be. fixed before the election. (Italics
added.) It renders fixed and stable the terms· of office, and
prevents an exercise of legislative power in legislating an incumbent in or out of office upon partisan considerations." This
view is most consistent with ,the principles of our elective system, and the uniform policy upon which the courts have acted.
}J..s far as we have been able to find all jurisdictions adhere to
this as the rule of public policy. In People vs. Foley, N. Y.
App., 43 N. E. 171, 73, the court recognized and declared this ·
the public policy vv-hen it said: nit may, of course, enlarge the
official term of town officers, but such action can operate only
upon officers thereafter elected.

Where the office is to be

filled by one authority and the duration of the term is to be
determined by another, the declaration of such duration must
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go before the :filliQ.g, so that each authority may have its legitimate exercise. People vs. Crooks, 53 N. Y. 648; People vs.
McKinney, 52 N. Y. 374; People vs. Bull, 46 N. Y. 57."
It is common knowledge that the Declaration of Independence is a declaration of principles and politi~s which are important in ol\r concep~ of government. Even the charges against
King George are criticisms for denial of such principles.
Among them is the right of the people to choose their officers
-those who govern them. When the constitution w~s written
it sought to encorporate a government founded upon the principles underlying the Declaration. The rights of the people
to choose their officers ·and to vote, the right to a republican
form of government, was zealously guarded.
As said by Justice Stephenson of Ohio in Board of Elections
vs. State Ex rel. Schneider, 128 0. St. 273, 191 N. E. 115, 97
A. L. R. 1417:
((A republican form of government can only be preserved
by securing to its electors the right to select their governors by
ballot, for terms fixed in advance by the le,gislature [or constitution] of the state." Again on Page 1426 of the A. L. R.' we
read:
(CWe think the idea of our constitution is that the people
shaJl choose a man to fit the established term, and not that
the legislature shall estab~ish a term to fit the n1an who
has been chosen."
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It seems to be plainly provided by our constitution that
elections shall be provided so that before the current term of
elective officers expires, the people may select the incumbent for
the succeeding term.
The Montana court in State vs. Levitz, ____ Mont. ____ , 146
Pac. 932, declared that the general policy of our government
. . . is that elections to office by the people, when it may be
conveniently done, is the general rule, and that public officials
should only obtain office otherwise when necessary to meet
the requirements of public business until the people rna y act.
In the words of the Gettysburg Address, this should be a government ttof the people, by the people, and for the people."
And in Wingate, Surrogate, vs. Flynn, 249 N. Y. S. 351, 139
Misc. 779; aff. 250 N. Y. S. 917; 223 App. Div. 789, 177 N. E.
195, 25.6 N.Y. 690, on page 355 of 249 N.Y. S. the court, after
quoting from the case of People vs. Palmer, supra, says: ((Public
policy requires that the term of an elective officer shall be fixed
before the election.''
We submit that on the grounds of public policy it must
be held that the term of Mr. Morrissey as county attorney expires January 3, 1949; and that the office of County Attorney
of Salt Lake County is a public elective office to be voted onat the general election in November, 1948, and the writ of
mandate should issue.
3. THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT DOES
NOT CHANGE THE EXISTING TERM OF OFFICE.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
It ·acts only on future elections and future terms of office.
It is not retroactive nor retrospective. Since it does not affect
the existing term it cannot be held to authorize the legislature
so to do.
McGrew vs. Indus. Com., 96 Ut. 191, 85 Pac (2nd) 608.
Dodkins vs. Reece, ____ Tex ____ , 17 S. W. (2nd) 81, 2, 34.
Board of Elections vs. Ohio, 128 Ohio St. 273, 191 N. E.
115, 97 A. L. R. 1417.
We see no room for doubt that the amendment had and
has no effect on the term of office of an incumbent who was
elected before the amendment became effective.

But should

it be contended that the amendment could be construed so as
to affect the existing term, we have explored the authorities as
to such . possible construction.
\Vhere duration or term of office is questioned, duration
must be confined to the shortest term.
It is well settled that where the duration or term of office
is a question of doubt or. uncertainty, the interpretation should

be followed which limits the office to the shortest term. Wright
vs. Adams, 45 Tex. 134; Dobkins vs. Reece, 17 S. W. (2nd) 81;
Chamski vs. Cowan, 288 Mich. 238, 284 N. W. 711, 22 R. C.L.
550; 43 Am. Jur. Paragraph 154. People Ex rel. Palmer, supra;
Lowrie vs. Brenan, 283 Mich. 63, 276 N. W. 900.
In the case of Dobkins vs. Reece, supra, the court quotes
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with approval the Wright vs. Adams case, supra, as follows:
Hit is believed, moreover, to be a sound rule of construction, which holds that when the duration or term of office,
which is filled by popular election, is a question of doubt or
uncertainty; that the interpretation is to be followed which
limits it to the shortest time, and returns to the people at
the earliest period the power and authority to refill it."
Turning to Article VIII, Section 10 of our constitution
which 'vas in effect at the time Edward M. Morrissey 'vas
elected, '"e read:
"A County Attorney shall be elected by the qualified
voters of each county who shall hold his office for· a term
of two years." (Italics added.)
The constitution thus created the office of county attorney
and limited the term of the county attorney to two years. Certainly, he cannot be elected for two terms at the same election,
a fortiori. Does the amendmen~ automatically act upon the
existing term and extend it two years? It does not so provide.
Can it be construed to do so. The question if worthy of consideration requires the appiication of ~oregoing rule of law that
of two possible modes of construing the constitution that one
should be followed which fixes the tenn to the shortest period.
Since there is a possible contention that the constitution is
silent as to the effect of the amendment extending the term of
office of the County Attorney to four years, as far as the Noven1ber 6, 1946 election incumben~ is concerned, and if weight is
given this contention, then the court should apply the general
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rule that ~COther considerations being equal that construction
of a doubtful provision of a statute or a constitution will be
followed, which limits the term of office to the shortest time."
Thoop' s Public Officers, section 308, Mechem's Public Offices
and Officers, Sec. 390. State Ex. rel. Birrell vs. Speak, 124 O~io
St. 636, 180 N. E. 264.

It must be conceded that the constitution provides that
the county attorney shall be elected for a definite term. There
is no provision defining or specifying any immediate effect of
this amendment. (IT WOULD BE CONTRARY TO ALL
PRECEDENT THAT THE ELECTORS SHOULD NOT BE
ADVISED, BEFORE CASTING THEIR VOTES, OF THE
DURATION OF THE TERM OF OFFICERS TO BE
ELECTED.) State Ex rel. Birrell vs. Speak, supra, People Ex
rei. Eldred vs. Palmer, supra. The constitution not having
specifically spoken on what effect the amendment was to have
on the term of office of the candidate elected prior to its effective date, by implication under the law provided that the minimum, or two year, period should be taken as the duration of
the term. To be consistent with the sound principles of the
elective system and in keeping with the uniform policy upon
which the courts have acted in de~ling with analogous conditions, we are required to so hold.

4. THE LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT (THE 1947
AMENDMENT TO SECTION 19-13-6 U. C. A. 1943) IN
SO FAR AS IT ATTEMPTS TO CONTINUE INCUMBENTS
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17
IN OFFICE BY BY-PASSING THE 1948 GENERAL ELECTION IS VOID:
(a) Because tl_le term was fixed by the constitution. In
the first point discussed in this brief we have shown that a term
of office is controlled by the constitutional or statutory provisions in force at the time of election, ·and that both constitution and statute fixed the term of county attorney at two years
from January 6, 1947. In addition to the authorities therein
cited, we call the attention of the court to a further array of
reasons and authorities to show the legislative effort to extend
the term of office to be invalid. If the constitution fixes the
duration of a term, the legislature may not change the term of
office, either to lengthen or shorten -it. 46 C. J. 967. Pinkston
vs. Watkins, 186 Ky. 365, 216 S. W. 852, held such to be the
rule even though a constitutional provision authorized the legislature to fix the time when one elected to office should enter
on his duties. So too when a constitutional provision is enacted
as to an office, the legislature cannot, by adopting a statute purporting to give effect to the constitutional. provision, alter the
term. State vs. Young, 139 La. 102, 68 S. 241. And even when
th~ constitution authorizes the legislature to fix the term, it
contemplates the exercise of such authority prior to an eiection.
People vs. Palmer, 154 N.Y. 133, 47 N. E. 1084, 85; 46 C. J.
967; Allison vs. Massey, 108 Okla. 140, 235 Pac. 192.

A very illumiqating case is State vs. Plasters, 74 Neb. 652,
105 N. W. 1092, 3 L. R.A. (N.S.) 887, 13 Ann. Cas. 154.
That was a case somewhat similar to ours where the legislature
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enacted a law to dispense with annual elections and hold general
elections only every two years. Such was within the legislative
power. But the legislature instead of providing that at the
next annual election, the officers should be elected for a two
yeat term, and biennially thereafter, provided that many officers
whose terms expired that fall should hold over until the fall
of the succeeding year when elections would be for two year
terms. Practically the situation here. The Nebraska court
in a well-reasoned and documented opinion voided the act.
The court said: ((The legislature has declared that (A' who is
now holding office, and whose term for which the people
elected him will expire in January next, shall hold that office
for another year. That is nothing else than providing by legislative enactment who shall be register of deeds in the respective
counties from January 1906 to January 1907. This we think
the legislature cannot do." Following this case in 13 Ann. Cas.is a NOTE which covers this subject well.' It states the rule
that even if the legislature has power to create the office, it
cannot by an act passed for .that purpose extend the term for
which the incumbent was elected. Matter of Haase, 88 App.
Div. (N.Y.) 242, 85 N.Y. S. 462, aff. 41 Misc. 114, 82 N.Y. S.
982; People vs. McKinney, 52 N.Y. 374; People vs. Foley, 148
N. Y. 677, 43 N. E.171; People vs. Randall, 151 N. Y. 497,
45 N. E. 841; Matter of Burger, 21 Misc. 370, 47 N.Y. S. 292;
State vs. Trewhitt, 173 Tenn. 561, 82 So. 480; State vs. Kres,
88 Wis. 135, 59 N. W. 593.

People vs. McKinney, 52 N. Y. 374, overruled People vs.
Batchelor, 22 N. Y. 128, which had held the legislature could
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extend the term of a town officer.
Where the constitution provides a limit for the term of an
office, the legislature cannot extend the term of the incumbent.
State vs. Brewster, 44 Ohio St. 589, 9 N. E. 849; Deweese vs.
State, 10 Ind. 343; State vs. Harvey, 4 Ohio Cir. Dec. 227, 8
Ohio Cir. Court 599.
In Sipe vs. People, 26 Colo. 127, 56 Pac. 571, it appears
that after election of a city treasurer in 1897, who under the
statute in effect at the time of his election would have held office
for a term of one year, th.e governor approved an act of the
legislature passed before the- election, v1hich made the term of
the city treasurer two years. The court held that
election
could not be held in 98 because the election law for it had been
repealed and under the constitution the incumbent conti11:ued
in office only because of the provision for holding over until
election of a successor. In Gammer vs. State, 163 Ind. 150, 71
N. E. 478, 66 L. R. A. 82, it seems the term of office of County
Treasurer as fixed by the constitution was two years. The
legislature passed an act providing that as to officers whose
term did not begin until January 1, 1903, no successors should
be elected until 1906. This act was defended upon the theory
that it merely fixed the time of commencement of the term.
The ccurt rejected the contention, saying that the pov1er to
fix commencement of terms was not intended to confer upon
. the legislature the power to postpone unnecessarily the election
of a successor to an office and thereby create a condition enabling an incumbent to hold office after the expiration of his

an

tenn.
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An enlightning case early referred to in this case calls for
further note here. Board of Elections vs. Ex Re Schneider
Ohio, 1,28 Ohio St 273, 191 NE 115, 97 ALR 1417, involved
county recorders under facts almost identical with those in
this case. The court in an elaborate opinion voided the ((term
extending" part of the statute.
(b) The legislature was not authorized to prescribe the
term of the county attorney. The people have spoken, and by
the constitution established the office and fixed the term thereof,
the legislature was powerless to legislate with respect thereto.
Such is the law laid down in People vs. Bull 46 NY 57, 7 Am.
Rtp 302, and the cases cited under topic (a) supra.
(c) We concede the right of the legislature to enact laws
setting up machinery for the election of county attorneys, and
to make the term conform to the constitutional amendment.
There is authority for the claim that within the term fixed
by the constitution, the legislature may fix the date of the
beginning and the end of the term. But all those cases hold
such acts must be done before the election, and cannot affect
any officer or his term of office for which election was held
before the legislature spoke. Alilson vs. Massey 108 Okla 140,
235 Pac 192; Treadwell vs. Colo Co. 62 Cal 140, 235 Pac 192,
People vs. Palmer 154 NY 133, 47 NE 1084. 46 CJ 967.
We think it clear that as far as the statutory act involved,
attempts to continue in office without election this year the
incumbent county attorneys, the sanie is null and void.
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We desire however as an aid to the court to call attention
to a rule recognized by some courts, and to aid the court in an
analysis of those cases, and their application of the rule they
discuss. We refer to the sometimes stated rule that the legislature, to harmonize terms or elections of county officers, or to
unify or eliminate elections when they become so numerous
as to burden the public, rna y make changes in election laws,
or change the beginning or ending date of a term, within constitutional li.tnitations, even though it may have the effect of
continuing an incumbent in office after ~e expiration of the
term for which he was elected. We have no arguments with
such statement nor the reasons upon which it is founded. But
this case does not come within that rule as justified or applied
by any of the decisions we have been able to find.
In the first place, the statutory enactment skipping the 1948
election and extending the two year term of the incumbent to
four years was not made to harmonize or unify the tenns of
county officers. The statutes as th~y existed prior to 1947, and_
as they now exist provide that the election of county officers
occurs every two years; some at one geenral election; and the
election of other county officers occur . in the next general
election. Whether the county attorney runs with one group in
elections or \Vith the other group in the alternate elections he
still runs in a year when there is a general election, at which
other county officers are being elected. It has always been and
still is the practice that two members of the County Con11nission
and the county attorney are elected in the one election, while
in the alternate election the county officers whose duties are
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mostly ministerial are elected. Since the county attorney is
the legal advisor and director of the county, his county duties
are essentially tied up with, and an important part of the policy
of making of the county. It seems most fitting, and consistent
with our form of county government that he should then be
elected at the same election as only the policy making part of
the county government is elected; that the policy making body
may more likely be harmonious, and approach its problems
from familiarity with the public will on the issues that determined the election.
In the second place the act under attack did not unify,
simplify, or eliminate any election. It is still necessary to hold
its general election every even numbered year in the county
for election of county officers.
Again the rule has never been recognized or applied where
it would extend the incumbency beyond the first succeeding
general election. Hutchinson vs. Pitts, 170 Ark. 245, 278 S. W.
639. The cases are reviewed and the rule stated in Russell vs.
State, 171 Ind. 62.3, 631, 87 N. E. 13, from which we quote:

/

none of two things must necessarily result; either that
the Legislature might postpone the commencement of a
term to such a term to such a time the commencement of
a term would be abridged by the election of a successor,
or the commencement of the term to be postponed beyond
every second election to such a time as that the expiration
of the term, unabridged, would pass a general election, and
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thus such a condition arises as that successive Legislatures
could pass every second election, and a portion of the
t~e the office be filled by the action of the Legislature,
or by appointment, and not by the voters; for example,
if appellant's theory is right, that his term began January
1, 1905 and terminated January 1, 1909, when appellee's
term would have begun, and extended to January 1913,
then '"hat is to prevent the Legislature in 1911 from postponing the commencement of the term of appellee's successor to January, 1914 expiring in 1918, thus passing the
general election of 1914, and so on, each alternate term?
It will thus he seen that it would put it in _the power of
the Legislature to ignore every second election, and fill
the office a good portion of the time, though an election
_would intervene every alternate four years, at which an
auditor might be elected.
ult then resolves itself jnto the question whether the .
Legislature is empowered under the Constitution to fix
the time of commencement of the term of office of a county
auditor when that result will be to postpone the expiration· of the term beyond one or more general elections,
and does it 'postpone unnecessarily the election of a successor to the office, and thereby create a cond~tion authorizing the incumbency to hold over after expiration of his
term'?
"Wheth~r

the voters ar~ entitled to fill an office at any
election depends upo_n the question as to whether the tern1
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of an officer will expire, so that but for such election a
vacancy will occur by limitation which is another way of
stating the proposition that they are entitled to elect at
the election next preceeding the expiration of the term.
It is conceded by the appellant that Lang's term expired
March 28, 1904: It must follow that appellant's term
began with the expiration of his term, or we would not
have the anomaly presented by the example put by us by
which the Legislature could fill the office, or invoke appointive power, instead of the elective a good part of the
time.

ccThe distinction between the cases cited by appellant
-Scott v. State, 151 Ind. 567, 52 N. E. 163; Weaver v.
the State, 152 Ind. 479, 53 N. E. 450; Aikman vs. State,
152 Ind. 567, 53 N. E. 836; State ex rel. McMullen vs.
Harris, 152 Ind. 699, 52 N. E. 168 - and the case here
presented is marked. In none of those cases did the fact
of the postponement of the commencement of the term
postpone its expiration, so that its expiration would be
beyond the holding of a general election next preceding
the expiration of the term." (Italics added.)

The court in State vs. Galusha, 74 Neb 188, 104 N. W.
197; and in Hensley vs. Plasters, 74 Neb. 652, 105 N. W. 1092,
3 L. R. A. (N.S.) 887, 3 Ann. Cas. 154, cited supra, review
the authorities and show they all hold to the same effect. See
also 46 C. J. 967. An annotation beginning on page 1437 to
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144~

of 97 A. L. R. makes an extensive review of the cases.
We commend it to the court.
We recapitulate:

1. The term of office is fixed by the law in effect at the

time of election.
2. A person elected, is elected to the office, and for the

term of office fixed by the constitution and statutes at
time of election, and not for any other term.
3. Public policy requires that the term of office be fixed
before election.
4. The constitutional amendment did not change the
existing term of office of the county attorney.
5. The legislature was not authorized to prescribe or fix
or change the term of office of the county attorney.
6. Any legislative rights to change term of office or tenure
therein by changing date of beginning or ending of
tenure must be exercised before election.
7. The legislative enactment here involved was not made

to harmonize terms of county officers; to unify or
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eliminate or simplify elections; it unreasonably prolongs the tenure in office of incumbents, and by carrying them over beyond the next general election amounts
to a legislative appointment, and destroys the elective
character of the office.
We respectfully submit that the term of office of the incumbent county attorney of Salt Lake County expires January 3,
1949; that the office of county attorney is a public elective office
to which the, incumbent after January 3, 1949, should be chosen
by the electors at the general election in November, 1948; and
that the Writ of Mandate prayed for in this action should issue.
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